

MENTAL PICTURE OF THE WORLD: VERBS OF MENTAL ACTIVITY AND THINKING/ KNOWING

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În articol se examinează una dintre problemele actuale, precum este mentalitatea și mijloacele ei de exprimare în limba engleză. În această lucrare, este reflectată corelația dintre activitatea intelectuală a omului și verbele de activitate mentală, prin care aceasta este reprezentată în lingvistică, și anume, prin verbele de gândire și cunoaștere. De asemenea, se subliniază necesitatea de folosire a abordării interdisciplinare, care ar lua în considerație diferite tratări și interpretări ale noțiunilor „gândire–gând” și „cunoaștere–cunoștință”.

Language cannot be perceived and studied without considering the natural interconnection of the processes taking place within the human brain, during our interaction with the world realities, including both intra- and inter- personal communication aspects. E. Benveniste [14] posited that “in a man it [language] is the connecting link between mental and socio-cultural life, and is at the same time the tool of their interaction, contributing, thereby, to constructing the mental picture of the world. According to Givon, language is viewed as a system of representation of knowledge, acquisition of new knowledge, remodeling/change of knowledge and the communication of new knowledge [4].

The choice for verbs belonging to the field of verbs of mental activity, manifesting brain/cognitive activity including those of thinking, knowing, and opinion, for the given research, has been stipulated by the fact that it is this group of verbs that is responsible for expressing important aspects of human relations, communication (both intra- and interpersonal), specific ways of their representation in language. The interest can be also explained by the importance of the verb per se as the most complex part of speech, which plays the central meaning forming role in the sentence. The verbs studied in the given research, include those forming the mental field, with the emphasis on the verbs of thinking and knowing. Recent findings in mental activity representation in natural language demonstrate this area’s actuality and importance of verb semantics study for linguistics science, as well as highlight the interdisciplinary aspect of the phenomenon, i.e. its connection to psychology, philosophy, logics, cognitive and ethno linguistics, etc.

The problem with defining *mentality* per se is partly stipulated by the fact that scholars often do not take into consideration the notion of *mentality* and its peculiarities, already developed and accumulated by other scientists, in this way often underestimating the problem of language mentality. To that end, it would be reasonable to address the notion of *mentality* considering its strong link to philosophical, psychological and language (linguistic) perspectives. *Mentality* definition and identification of the ways of its representation go among those most important and disputable problems related to mental processes description in natural language.

To follow on the importance of this influence, the analysis of the existing definitions of *mentality* related concepts has been made in the given research. *Mentality* definition and identification of the ways of its representation go among those most important and disputable problems related to mental processes description in language. Based on the definitions provided in the Philosophical Dictionary, *mentality* (from Lat. Mens-thought, thinking, way of thinking) presents deep level of collective or individual consciousness, including the subconscious; it is a set of availabilities, attitudes and predispositions of an individual or social group to act, think, feel and perceive the world in a certain way [19]. It is also noted in the dictionary that *mentality* is formed depending on traditions, culture, social structures, as well as the whole sphere of a person’s living environment, in its turn forming them, and acting as a not easily defined source of cultural-historic dynamics. The meaning of the word “mentality” has been also elicited from the following language dictionaries: Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (LDCE), its online version, Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary (CALD), Cambridge Dictionary of American English (CDAE), Roget’s II. The New Thesaurus (RNT), Answers.com, Thesaurus, and Dicționarul explicativ al limbii române (DEX). *Mentality* in LDCE is presented by two entries, including the following: 1. [U] the abilities and powers of the mind: a person of weak mentality; and 2. [C] person’s habitual way of thinking; character. Its online version provides the following definition: a

particular attitude or way of thinking, especially one that you think is wrong or stupid, e.g. a get-rich-quick **mentality**; e.g., I can't understand the **mentality** of the people who are behind this kind of violence.

Based on the definition provided in the CALD, *mentality* is a person's particular way of thinking about things, e.g. I can't understand the **mentality** of people who hurt defenseless animals. *Mentality* is defined as "a person's or group's way of thinking about things" in CDAE, e.g. They buy everything on credit - they have this play now, pay later **mentality**. According to RNT, *mentality* has the following two meanings: 1. The thought processes characteristic of an individual or group: ethos, mind, mindset, psyche, psychology; 2. The faculty of thinking, reasoning, and acquiring and applying knowledge: brain (often used in plural), brainpower, intellect, intelligence, mind, sense, understanding, wit. The Roget's Thesaurus Online dictionary online version defines *mentality* as: 1. mental capacity, power, or activity; mind; 2. mental attitude or outlook; state of mind. *Mentality* is presented as "the sum of a person's intellectual capabilities or endowment" in the Answers.com, and the following two entries in Thesaurus: 1. The thought processes characteristic of an individual or group: ethos, mind, mindset, psyche, psychology. 2. The faculty of thinking, reasoning, and acquiring and applying knowledge: brain (often used in plural), brainpower, intellect, intelligence, mind, sense, understanding, wit. DEX provides the definition as follows: Fel particular de a gândi al unui individ sau al unei colectivități.

Based on the definitions of *mentality* provided in the Philosophical Dictionary, Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (LDCE), its online version, Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary (CALD), Cambridge Dictionary of American English (CDAE), Roget's II. The New Thesaurus (RNT), Answers.com, Thesaurus, as well DEX, one can monitor the key words highlighting the essential shades of its meaning regardless of the variety of existing definitions, namely "the (particular) way of thinking", "(intellectual) capabilities/abilities of the mind"; whereas such notions as "thinking", "understanding", and "knowledge" would always indicate to its (mentality) nature, which influences its representation in language.

Following Kolesov, we in the given paper understand *mentality* as world outlook/Weltanschauung in categories and forms of natural language, uniting in the process of cognition of intellectual, spiritual and will characteristics of national character in its typical manifestations"[15]. In the present work the term "language mentality" is used with its (mentality) reference, first of all to the world outlook consciousness structure, as well as to the consolidation of the results of thinking activity in natural language [17]. The problem related to the ways of representation of mentality by various language means is actual for modern linguistics. Verbs of mental activity, or predicates "describing the sphere of mental activity in the broad meaning of the word" [13] are viewed as the main means of expressing *mentality* in language. Terminological diversity, however, when the same verbs are tagged "mental", "putative", "factive", "verbs of propositional attitude", "parenthetical", "performative", "epistemic", "psychological" verbs, etc., is indicative of the fact that there does not exist the unanimity in understanding of semantic and functional characteristics of these units. Being one of the means of expressing mentality in language, mental activity verbs (predicates), are examined in this paper as lexemes that not only name the thinking process, but also contain in their semantics the elements of its description, as well as understanding, and cognition of reality by the individual language personality and (ethno) linguistic community as a whole, thereby taking into consideration the sociolinguistic aspect.

While considering the mental activity verbs, we find it important to take into consideration not only the data registered in the dictionaries, but also those aspects that are functionally manifested in mental verbs use in speech acts, in various context conditions, to contribute to deeper perception of the role that these verbs play in expressing human's thoughts, perceptions, intentions, feelings, opinion forming and expressing, etc. while communicating with the world (interpersonal communication/activity), and those characterizing his/her mental abilities (intrapersonal one).

The most frequently used and studied in the given research verbs of mental activity, include *think, believe, consider, suppose, ponder, mull, ruminate, remember, mean, know, learn, guess, understand, realize, meditate, find (out), seem, and cogitate*, i.e. those characterizing the mental field. The study of the verbs of mental field presents a fragment of the language picture of the world, related to the person's inner world, which at the same time reflects the experience accumulated through communication and interaction with it (world). Taking into consideration continuous interconnection between all mental processes going on in human's mind, it is necessary to take into account the interrelations between the verbs of mental activity, i.e. those of thinking, knowing, opinion, etc.

All structural elements of the mental field are in this or that way correlated to the concept of thinking/ thought and knowing/ knowledge. *Thinking* covers various operations of our mind, applied in our everyday

life (e.g. believing, remembering, thinking of something, imagining, thinking up, etc.), that represent the most important functions of ordinary mind. According to Melnichuk, *hinking* is “active, defining certain patterns, mental handling of mental data held in mind, that represent true and imaginary phenomena and events of reality, and consist of concrete concepts about them...”[16] The author also highlights that it is the characteristic feature, specificity of human thinking to be able to transform the possessed sensual experience, and to enable to get knowledge about such properties; qualities and attitudes of objects which are not available for direct cognition. *Thinking*, therefore, 1) enlarges human’s cognitive skills and abilities, allowing for penetration into the patterns of relationship of nature and society, and, what is of great importance, 2) can be aimed at him/herself, i.e., can discover his/her own qualities and abilities. Thus, *thinking* is not only an instrument of cognition, but also the one of self-cognition (language acting as the instrument of thinking).

In the process of *thinking* a person gradually switches from one stage to another. As there exists close continuous interrelation between all mental processes going on in human’s mind, it is considered necessary to take into account the correlations between different verbs of mental activity. M. Fortescue in the article “Thoughts about thought”, commenting on the interrelations of knowledge, thinking, understanding, and memory, marks that “... when you think, you think about what you know, imagine or suppose is to happen, what you remember or are going to do, and you can consider that the object of your thoughts discovers certain features; in the process of thinking you can understand it better”. Mental activity verbs united in the considered in the given research mental field, are characterized by commonality of meaning. All structural elements of the mental field are in this or that way correlated to the concept of thinking/ thought. *Thinking* presents the process, and as any process, it presupposes such components as subject, process itself, object, the second object, instrument, the process representation, and time parameter. With regard to this, it is essential to consider the notion of “thinking” within the interdisciplinary approach, i.e. from different perspectives, including the one related to language itself (linguistic). *Thinking* covers various operations of our mind, applied in our everyday life (e.g. believing, remembering, thinking of something, imagining, thinking up, etc.), that represent the most important functions of ordinary mind.

Following the information looked up in The New Encyclopedia Britannica, *thinking* in everyday language covers several distinct mental activities. It sometimes can act as a synonym for “tending to believe”, especially with less than full confidence (e.g. I **think** that it will rain, but I am not sure.). Alongside other activities, it at other times denotes whatever is in consciousness, especially when it refers to something outside the immediate environment (e.g. It made me **think** of my old grandmother.). It is also highlighted in the encyclopedia that through the psychologists’ focus, *thinking* is considered as intellectual exertion aimed at finding an answer to a question or means of achieving a desirable practical goal. According to the definition provided in the Psychology dictionary, *thinking/ thought* is a process of cognitive activity of an individual, characterized by generalized and mediated reflection of the individual’s activity, and is the subject of composite interdisciplinary research. Its main forms include: notion; judgment/ opinion, and deduction. *Thinking* is defined as follows in the Philosophical Dictionary: “an active process of reflecting the objective world in notions, judgments, theories, related to solving various tasks, the highest product of the specially organized matter, i.e. the brain. It is also marked there that thinking is closely connected with speech, and its (thinking) results are fixed in the language. Abstractness, analysis, and synthesis are considered typical of *thinking*.”

According to the Cambridge Dictionary of American English, *thinking* is the process of forming an opinion or idea about something, or the opinions or ideas formed by this process, e.g. I feel that his **thinking** is outdated in some ways. *Thinking* can be also defined as “the process of thought; the process of exercising the mind in order to make a decision” [21]. The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English Advanced Learner's Dictionary online version defines *thinking* as follows: 1. your opinion or ideas about something, or your attitude towards it, e.g. Well, to my way of **thinking** (=in my opinion), they should have done that years ago. 2 when you think about something, e.g. Tillie could have been badly hurt. I really needed to do some **thinking**. In DEX we find the following definition of *thinking/thought (gând)*: 1. Proces de gândire sau rezultatul procesului de gândire; idee, cuget, cugetare. 2. Închipuire, imaginație, fantezie; inspirație. 3. Loc considerat casediu al cugetării; minte, memorie. 4. Intenție, plan. 5. Convingere, părere. 6. Voie, dorința, plac. *Gândire* is defined as: 1. Facultate superioară a creierului omenesc, care reflectă în mod generalizat realitatea obiectivă prin noțiuni, judecăți, teorii, etc. 2. Factor ideal care constituie reflectarea realității obiective: spirit, conștiință. 3. Idee, gând cuget; meditare, reflecție. 4. Imaginație, fantezie. According to DEX, *cugetare* is “acțiunea de a cugeta și rezultatul ei; gândire, idee. / Judecată, raționament. / Meditație, reflecție.”

Goddard [5] in “Thinking across languages and cultures: Six dimensions of variation” article defines at least four semantic configurations of *thinking* that tend to be widely attested: a) thinking about what can happen and feeling something because of it (propositional attitudes), e.g., hope, expect, look forward to, dread, b) thinking about something for some time, so as to sustain a feeling (“active” emotions), e.g. rejoice, worry; c) thinking good or bad things about someone and feeling something because of it (interpersonal attitudes), e.g., love, admire, respect, hate, despise; d) feelings associated with thinking (emotions), e.g., happy, jealous, surprised, disgusted.

Interaction of the components of semantic structure of mental activity verbs shows the variety of thinking process situations. The specifics of the relation of verbs of mental activity with *thinking* are comprised in possessing the integral seme of “implementation of mental activity”. Thinking process always presupposes direction of the subject’s thought to the object, which can be direct or indirect, explicit or implicit, concrete or abstract, animate or inanimate, etc. Thus, for instance, in the semantic structure of the verbs *think, know, consider, believe, suppose, learn, ponder, muse, see*, etc. there is no indication to the direct object, while the ability to think itself, whether directly or in abstracto, has the indirect object of thought, without which the proof of thinking process is impossible. The basic model “thinking subject- process of thought- object of thought”, characteristic for semantics of mental verbs and generally expressing the essence of the reflected typical situation, which is connected with the thinking process, can be viewed as the basis for linguistic description of mental verbs within the semantic field of verbs of mental activity. There exist various classifications and approaches to study of verbs of thinking in linguistics, each of them having advantages and disadvantages of its own. Vasiliev, for example, divides them into the ones with the meaning of thinking process, verbs with the meaning of the result of thinking act, verbs with the nuclear meaning of “suppose”, “think”, the verbs with nuclear meaning of “handle, solve”, the verbs with nuclear meaning of “believe”, the verbs with nuclear meaning of “to err”, etc. According to Nijegorodtseva-Kirichenko, “thinking” and “understanding” are two different concepts, while by Vasiliev; the verbs with nuclear meaning of “understand” are included into the class of verbs of thinking. It proves again the fact that even though the language reflects human’s real activity, the language picture of the world cannot coincide entirely with the cognitive picture of the world either by its completeness, integrity, or structure. Besides, comparing the classification of mental verbs in the works of Vasiliev and Paducheva, it becomes clear that in language, the division of lexis can be made on different basis, and one and the same word can be included into one or another semantic field, class, group, etc.

The approaches to the study of thinking concept, and verbs of thinking respectively, vary, and each of them has strengths and weaknesses of its own, which can be justified by the complexity of the mental field, be it viewed in logic, philosophy, psychology, or linguistics. The *thinking* universality nature has been pointed out in a number of linguistic works, when such verbs as *think, know, want, feel*, etc. are treated as mental predicates within the universal primes/universals framework (Goddard, Wierzbicka, etc.). In Fortescue’s words, the situations when a given language has a single, synchronically opaque basic word for general mental activity, like English *think* (displaying though various kinds of polysemy) are rather common [6]. The author at the same time marks that languages may have a wealth of other more specialized (e.g., philosophical, psychological) or stylistically marked terms, like English *meditate, conceive, deduce, reason, speculate, muse, contemplate*, etc., and basic words which do not cover the core meaning of general mental activity, like *believe* (or the equivalent ASL sign, consisting of touching the forehead followed by claspings the hands—literally “holding on to a thought”).

Think, as mentioned in Arnauld’s work, presented a prime example of an indefinable word for Cartesians. A. Wierzbicka and associates (within the natural semantic metalanguage (NSM) approach) also indicate to the inappropriateness of defining, for instance, *thinking* in terms of words/phrases like “cogitation”, “cognition”, “cognitive processes” and the like, providing as an example some related “dictionary definitions” as provided in The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (AHDOTEL 1973), i.e. “to think”- to have a thought, “thought”- the act or process of thinking; cogitation; “cogitation”:1. Thoughtful consideration; 2. A serious thought. One should admit that there is certain ground for it. While looking up the definitions for the verbs of mental activity field, you will encounter the entries defining the related verb through its synonyms. Thus, the meanings of “to believe”, “to consider”, and/or “to have an opinion” can be easily traced in “think” definitions, for instance, in Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary and Webster’s New World Large Print Dictionary, American Wordpower Dictionary, Oxford ESL Dictionary, Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English. A. S. Hornby with A. P. Cowie, etc.

Those supporting the NSM approach state that it would be considered ambiguous and circular to attempt to “define” the concept of thinking by reference to expressions such as mental (or cognitive) processes, because terms like mental and cognitive are not any clearer than thinking in the first place (there are other kinds of mental or cognitive processes aside from thinking — such as wanting, knowing, and feeling, for example) [5]. A. Wierzbicka in her “In the world of signs: Essays in Honour of Professor Jerzy Pelc”, comments on *thinking* as one of the fundamental human concepts, which is impossible to define. Thus, within the NSM approach, *think* is a universal semantic prime, and it therefore provides a stable reference point for cross-linguistic comparison. The approach followers believe that it allows an orderly and explanatory treatment free from the obscurity and terminological ethnocentrism of complex terms such as cognitive activity, mental state, etc. The status of *thinking* as an indivisible “basic” category is also discussed by Michael Fortesque in his “Thoughts About Thought” work, mentioning that all the world’s languages would appear to have at least one word that would refer to general mental activity unavailable to external observation, such as English *think* (or the corresponding nominalization thought).

Based on combination of observations in previous studies and his own, Fortesque considers (at least) three distinct basic types of *thinking*: the so called “natural “seams”, judging or evaluating some person or thing; believing in the truth of a proposition (or the existence of a state or thing); and simply “mulling over” mental content. The semantic areas defined by these seams are only approximate, however, and the actual words in any synchronic language may stand in a manifold relationship with them. The object (or content) of these various mental activities is something that has already been acquired through experience (or second-hand learning), or can be projected by imagination from such experience. At the same time, *thinking* is characterized by an essential element of novelty. It is, therefore, not surprising that words referring to such activity are either etymologically opaque or “slippery” ones.

It is also highlighted in the work that apart from the “believe” and “consider” senses (referring to ongoing states), *thinking* in general is orientated towards the future, and is viewed as a goal-orientated activity. *Thinking*, thus, is noted as the goal-oriented towards future activity. Considering *think* within the framework of other verbs of mental activity, however, its meaning as “pure cogitation”... “even without any outer manifestation whatsoever...”, should be paid special attention to. In her “In the world of signs” work, Wierzbicka also points out to the importance of taking into consideration that with *think* (as with many other conceptual primitives) there exist cultural differences between different societies, which may make it difficult to understand the identity of the underlying conceptual systems. She provides the example with the “innocent looking” sentence “I think such-and-such, but I don’t know”, which would be more “friendly” (appropriate) for some cultures than to others. For example, the author comments on the emphasis made expressing opinions and distinguishing opinions from facts in Anglo culture. In contrast, for example, for Polish culture the phrase “I think” is less common than it is in English, which can be explained by the fact that it is more natural for people there to express their opinion in the same way as they state the facts, i.e. using “This is good/like that...” rather than “I think this is good...”

The provided above discussions, mirror the complexity and interdependency of various aspects of study of *thinking* (process), the variety of approaches to its definition and research, the importance of taking into account an array of nuances, including but not limited to perceiving *thinking* as an active multifaceted process of reflecting the objective world, thereby forming ideas and opinion about different phenomena. *Thinking* enables human beings to transform the acquired sensual experience and to extend our cognitive skills, contributing to not only better penetration into patterns of relationship of nature and society, but also to discover further “ourselves”, our own qualities and possibilities (*thinking* being an instrument of cognition and self-cognition). *Thinking* is marked by a number of linguists as the category with the status of indivisible “basic” one, demonstrating that all the languages possess (at least) one word that would refer to general mental activity unavailable to external observation, such as English *think*, thereby highlighting its universality.

Knowledge, due to its ambiguity, is one of those words that one knows exactly what it means until one is forced to define it, when you try to pin it down in definite terms. The question about what *knowledge* is, is not complex from the viewpoint of content, as every person knows approximately what it is, the difficulties starting when one tries to deal with the details. It is impossible to say that *knowledge* is the state which is either “present” or “absent”, as a man cannot know something without the knowledge of what he knows, understands and is aware of. [9]. *Knowledge* expresses first of all the result of cognitive activity, and the majority of mental

processes are oriented to namely this result. It (knowledge) is sometimes posited as the matrix of impressions within which an individual situates newly acquired information. In the entries of the online business dictionary [24], *knowledge* is defined as “human faculty resulting from interpreted information; understanding that germinates from combination of data, information, experience, and individual interpretation” [23]. The term 'knowledge' is also often used to refer to a body of facts and principles accumulated by mankind in the course of time. According to Drucker, who highlights the importance of “external knowledge in action” [3], *knowledge* nowadays should be viewed as information effective in action, information focused on results, emphasizing that those results are seen far beyond the person, i.e. in society and economy, or in the advancement of knowledge itself. Following this, Schon observes the necessity of keeping in mind the intrinsic or tacit element in applying knowledge to action [10]. *Knowledge* can be thereby also understood as accumulated external and explicit information belonging to the community, being leveraged by tacit intrinsic insights which originate within individuals who then may act alone or cooperatively in order to control or integrate with their environment [22].

Similar to other words related to the field of mental activity, “knowledge” has not but once been claimed as difficult or impossible to define. It often leads to appearance of identical wording, with the use of the same notions. In this way, *knowledge* is claimed to be clear for language speakers by itself [12], which goes in line with the similar view by A. Wierzbika and associates within the NSM approach regarding also such verbs as *think*. Like *think*, the verb *know* is referred to the group of semantic primitives, the main argument for this being the fact that its segmentation into such components as *believe*, *think*, *hope*, etc., cannot express all the richness of the meanings which this verb has. Related idea led to Wierzbika’s metalanguage creation, the latter consisting of the so called semantic primitives, i.e. words, the meaning of which is clear to language speakers without any explanation, at the same time being practically impossible to be explained.

As the notion “knowledge” can be expressed also by verbs of understanding, opinion, belief, perception, English verb “see”, for example, in certain contexts can serve to denote a fact of knowledge or understanding, e.g. I **see** what you mean, etc. Similar tendency can be traced in comparing verbs “hear” and “know”, when we consider the sentences: “Do you **know** a book called “...”? The understanding of the verb *know* in its direct meaning would implicit the knowledge of the contents of this book, and would be translated as “Ati citit cartea...?», while the given context presupposes the knowledge about the fact of existing of such a book, i.e. “Ați auzit vreodată despre așa o carte?/ Știți așa o carte ...?”. It can be also concluded that the English expression “I see” (“Eu înțeleg/știu”) indicates to the connection of visual perception and understanding. Arutiunova also emphasizes the synthesis of knowledge and visual perception in some types of usage of the verb “see” in the following examples: “I **saw** them coming back home= it is true that they have come back home, as I saw as they were coming back home”; “You **know** who came?- I saw (= I know, because I saw). The connection between *knowledge* and visual perception is also expressed in the fact that the verb “to see” can be used in the meaning of “find out”/“clarify”. Similar connection can be traced also between auditory perception and knowledge (*hear/heard* in the meaning of “know, learn, find out”, e.g., I’ll see = I’ll find out).

The questions immediately arising while discussing such an ambiguous multifold concept as *knowledge*, are touched upon in various research papers on defining *knowledge* and its language representation. The issues related to illusory of mind/thought and uselessness of subject’s cognition of visual environment and ability of defining the state which the subject could call “knowledge” in the field of language philosophy, were reflected in the works of Stroud and Lehrer K. In S. Larsen’s works, the focus is on the issue of dynamics of knowledge, and possibility of its correction /update in the process of communication. In the framework of cognitive linguistics, the “network of knowledge” is always subjected to permanent corrective and progressive renovation in the course of changes in the world, life of the subject. “Knowledge correction” presents the process of saving/storing/keeping of the knowledge in use, as well as renovation, and replacement of the knowledge which was unclaimed before.

Knowledge possession used to be considered as invariant state of the acknowledgement of facts, objects, phenomena and processes of real world. In cognitive linguistics and psychology, though, *knowledge* is viewed as a process of realizing the changes taking place in objects’ content, phenomena, and processes of the visual environment. Moreover, the renewal of knowledge network depends on subject’s realization of changes in his/her own picture of the world through the so-called “cashing” of information. By “cashing” of the information is meant the subject’s active participation in the process of processing of the already existing information into something meaningful and important, which subsequently becomes his/her experience and knowledge,

reflected in the so called “world of unlimited knowledge” a) about which a person didn’t hear, b) the world about which a person heard and c) the world of the firsthand/ direct experience. *Knowledge* can be sometimes to a certain degree based not on the direct knowledge of objects, things, and phenomena, but on the indirect knowledge of facts related to the same sphere. Thereby, *knowledge* can be received both directly from communication, and from indirect sources (visual, perceptual, sensory experience, manipulation of objects, education, etc.). Whatever is discussed, in the process of communication, the subject transfers to the interlocutor the knowledge about the objects, phenomena and events in the form of facts with different degree of specification. In the framework of experimental psychological direction, *knowledge* was considered as the primordial in relation to intellect factor by such scholars as D. Bruner, Luria, A.W. Staats, Luria.

Dealing with *knowledge* notion related issues and verbs of knowing, it is of importance also to consider the interconnections and differences between *knowledge* and *knowing*. Those two theoretical perspectives (of *knowledge* and *knowing*) represent general intellectual strategies of understanding the peculiar ways human beings know. To this end, there exist two approaches, the rationalistic and performative ones. The basic idea of the first approach is the rationalistic assumption of the existence of an apriori knowable external reality, true at all times and in all places and which is the highest grade of knowledge’ [2]. *Knowledge* within the rationalistic approach, is viewed as an object that exists on its own and is dissociated from individuals, applications, and social context, resulting in a “spectator” theory of knowledge” that separates theory from practice. [1]. At the same time, acquiring new knowledge is equal to ‘unveiling’ or ‘discovering’ something pre-existing (apriori), what was there all along... needs a few people .. to help it to appear in public’[7]. *Knowledge*, as it is reflected in related metaphorical phrases used in discourse, can ‘circulate’ and be ‘shared’, ‘exchanged’, ‘sold’, ‘accumulated’, ‘stored’ or ‘get lost’, etc. Furthermore, the rationalistic approach yields the idea that *knowledge* consists of commensurable quanta, and presupposes that new knowledge expands and advances old knowledge.

In contrast to *knowledge*, *knowing* indicates that what is known rather than a thing or a static property should more adequately be seen as the ‘ability’ to act’. Stehr highlights the fact that *knowing* is active notwithstanding that “to know” is considered a stative verb. *Knowing* is “situated in practice” [11], and it only becomes meaningful in relation to a distinct social practice. In the correlations between rationalistic and performative (practical) approaches, one can trace in *knowledge* the individualistic (an individual possesses knowledge entities) component, and the collective nature (a person presenting a part of an epistemic community). The analogous relations can be traced in internal/ external sides of *thinking*. Orlikowski emphasizes that *knowing* is an ongoing social accomplishment, constituted and reconstituted in everyday practice, and it, therefore, cannot exist in a completed status, which in turn presupposes it being in permanent flux [8].

Doing research in verbs of *knowing*, it is also necessary to consider the relations/distinctions existing between the tacit knowing and explicit knowledge, Gertler mentions that the tacit dimension of knowledge exists in the background of our consciousness. It is difficult to share, as it requires development of self-awareness on part of those possessing tacit knowledge, in order to describe and explain to others (make public) what they have already accumulated and know. Tacit knowledge, thereby, can only be shared during its application and execution in practice. *Identification*, the initial stage of cognitive activity, signalizes that the subject through sense perception, recognizes the objects of surrounding reality that possess certain characteristics, the subject himself/herself taking part in the process (of identification). The verb “know” in such cases is usually modified by adverbial constructions with the meaning of the image of the action, e.g. well, immediately, distinctly, etc that underline the degree of knowledge/acquaintance with the object, by temporal adverbs : for a long time, for ages. In this connection, the frame “degree of knowledge” is built upon the hierarchy of definitions, based on the degree of awareness of the agent with the object of knowledge, and the information he/she has access to, understanding the gist, etc. This frame describes the *knowledge*, received in empirical way or at secondhand – secondhand knowledge.

For the scope of the given research, definitions of *knowledge* have been looked up in different language dictionaries. *Knowledge* is presented through the following entries in the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language: 1. the state or fact of knowing; 2. familiarity, awareness, or understanding gained through experience or study; 3. the sum or range of what has been perceived, discovered, or learned; 4. learning, erudition, e.g. teachers of great knowledge; 5. specific information about sth.; 6. Carnal knowledge. The nouns “knowledge”, “information”, “learning”, “erudition”, “lore”, and “scholarship” are marked as the ones

referring to what is known, as by having been acquired through study or experience. It should be mentioned, however, that “knowledge” (like “thought”) possesses the broadest meaning as it includes facts and ideas, understanding, and the totality of what is known, e.g. A **knowledge** of Greek thought and life, and of the arts in which the Greeks expressed their thought and sentiment, is essential to high culture”. “Information” is usually viewed as being narrower in scope than knowledge, it also often implies a collection of facts and data, e.g. Obviously, a man’s judgment cannot be better than the **information** on which he has based it. It is “learning” which is known as referring to knowledge gained by schooling and study, e.g. **Learning** is not attained by chance, it must be sought for with ardor and attended to with diligence. Profound knowledge (often in a specialized area) is associated with “erudition”, while “scholarship” emphasizes the mastery of a particular area of learning, and “lore” refers to practical or professional knowledge, as well as about a particular subject that is gained through tradition or anecdote.

Webster’s New Thesaurus of the English Language defined “knowledge” through the following entry: learning, erudition, scholarship, mean what is or can be known by an individual or by mankind, where knowledge applies to facts or ideas acquired by study, investigation, observation, or experience, e.g. rich in knowledge gained from life. In turn, *learning* applies to *knowledge* acquired through formal, often advanced, schooling, e.g. a book that is evidence of the author’s vast learning; while erudition implies the acquiring of profound, bookish learning, e.g. erudition unusual even for a classicist. *Scholarship* emphasizes the possession of learning characteristic of the advanced scholar in a specialized field of study or investigation, e.g. a work of first-rate literary scholarship. “Knowledge” in Merriam-Webster’s online Dictionary is defined/presented as: 1 obsolete : cognizance; 2 a (1) : the fact or condition of knowing something with familiarity gained through experience or association (2) : acquaintance with or understanding of a science, art, or technique b (1) : the fact or condition of being aware of something (2) : the range of one’s information or understanding, c : the circumstance or condition of apprehending truth or fact through reasoning : *cognition* d : the fact or condition of having information or of being learned; 3 arch.: sexual intercourse; 4 a : the sum of what is known : the body of truth, information, and principles acquired by humankind b archaic : a branch of learning.

Contemporary English Advanced Learner’s Dictionary provides the following entries for *knowledge*: 1. (of) what a person knows; the facts, information, skills, and understanding that one has gained, esp. through learning or experience, e.g. a man of considerable knowledge (= who knows a lot); e.g. discoveries that have increased the sum of human knowledge (= the amount that people know). 2 [U] the state of being informed about something; awareness, e.g. The matter was never brought to the knowledge of the minister. (= He never found out or was never told about it.) *Knowledge* is presented through the following in the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English: 1. [U, sg.] the information, understanding and skills that you gain through education or experience; 2 [U] the state of knowing about a particular fact or situation. DEX on-line version [20] provides the following entries for knowledge, i.e. “cunoașterea” and “cunoștința” as given below.

Cunoaștere, acțiunea de a cunoaște și rezultatul ei: 1. reflectare în conștiință a realității existente independent de subiectul cunoscător, e.g. teoria cunoașterii 2. faptul de a poseda cunoștințe, informații, date asupra unui subiect, asupra unei probleme; cunoștință (1). According to „synonyms” source, the following meanings are highlighted: *Cunoaștere* s. 1. înțelegere, percepție, pricepere. (Proces de ~.) 2. (înv.) știință, știre, știutură. (~ lucrurilor.) 3. pricepere, stăpânire. (~ mai multor meserii.) 4. posedare, stăpânire. (~ mai multor limbi.) *Cunoștința* is also defined in the paperbased DEX [18] as : 1. cunoaștere (2). Expr. A avea –lua cunoștință de ceva = a ști, a fi informat. A aduce (ceva) la cunoștința cuiva = a informa pe cineva (despre ceva) În cunoștință de cauză = cunoscând bine ceva. 2. (La pl.) totalitatea noțiunilor, ideilor, informațiilor pe care le are cineva într-un domeniu oarecare. 3. persoană pe care vorbitorul o cunoaște (a face cunoștință cu cineva) = a lega relații sociale cu o persoană.

The given research covers such verbs of knowing as *know*, *believe*, *guess*, *learn*, *find (out)*, *understand*, *remember*, *realize*, *think*, *consider*, *suppose*, *see*. One of the difficulties of the study of the semantic field of knowledge refers to the fact that the state of knowledge, being one of constituents human mental activity, is in close connection with other mental processes. As they are all interconnected, differentiation of these processes can be considered as rather conditional or conventional in both psycholinguistics and in language in general. In this connection, Zalevskaya states that all types of mental activity like thinking, speech, memory, perception and others, function in ensemble, i.e. these mental processes ontologically do not exist as separate/

isolated acts, being however, artificially differentiated with the scope of scientific analysis, the fact remaining, though, that human's activity, all our life "consists of everything". Like the verb "think" in the group of verbs of thinking, "know" is the lead verb while studying the verbs of knowing, and is also difficult for defining it due to its belonging to the so called semantic primitives.

The attempts to analyze the semantic field of knowledge were made not but once regardless of the complexity of the issue. Originally, the studies were focused on the nucleus of the field, i.e. on the verb "to know", which was, though, viewed as the reflection of philosophical notion of knowledge. It was under study by foreign philosophers of the XXth century like Moore, Russel, Wittgenstein as well as by Russian linguists in the logical aspect, the "Logical analysis" problem group. To that point, the "know" predicate was researched from different angles, being thereby studied among the epistemic predicates, predicates of propositional attitude, modal words, verbs of mental activity, verbs of sense perception. The verb "to know" was particularly considered in comparison with the verbs of opinion in English. The most examined, studied one, though, is the meaning of the verb "know", usually called as "propositional". Despite the approach followed, however, while studying verbs of knowing, presenting a part of semantic field of verbs of mental activity, it is of vital importance to take into consideration such an essential issue as the interconnection of various mental processes, and thereby the mobility of boundaries between them.

In the process of communication the subject, depending on his/her intentions and assurance of his/her knowledge, explicates his/her position towards the presented facts through verbs of mental activity. Using the verb "to know", the speaker expresses his/her knowledge about the subject of conversation and complete possession of information in a certain field/area, or its part. The interconnections of the verb "know" and other mental verbs can be traced historically, i.e. in their development. As one of the illustrative examples we could use the "evolution" of the words denoting gustatory sensation: Latin verb "sapere" ("to feel/sense the taste of something") acquired the meaning "to know" in Romance languages. As *know* refers to mental predicates, it is also of interest how these predicates are correlated, and how they reflect in language the human mental activity itself. The verb "know", the leading verb among those of verbs of knowing, means not only knowledge, received from the external sources, but also knowledge acquired on the basis of personal experience, including on the basis of knowledge of other persons (e.g. know a person/ pain, etc.), reflecting again on its (knowledge) external and internal components.

The provided above discussions reflect on the complexity and numerous interconnections of various aspects of study of thinking (process), knowledge being a part of it, the variety of approaches to defining the notion of knowledge in related disciplines, as well as the importance of taking into consideration its multifold nature and relations to other mental processes. Like the verb "think" in the group of verbs of thinking, "know" is the lead verb while studying the verbs of knowing, and is difficult for defining it due to its belonging to the semantic primitives.

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